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Understanding Female Suicide Terrorism in Sri Lanka 
through a Constructivist Lens 
Matthew P. Dearing 
Suicide terrorism has been an increasing phenomenon with global implications since the 1980s. 
There have been over 1,944 suicide attacks globally,[1] most emanating from Islamic 
fundamentalist organizations.[2] However, many organizations have taken their cues from the 
strategy and tactics of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who have implemented a 
consistent suicide terror campaign since the start of their nationalist independence movement in 
1987. Sri Lanka has experienced a unique culture of martyrdom distinct from those created by 
Islamic fundamentalists, primarily in their extraordinary use of female suicide bombers. Since 
1987, there have been at least 109 LTTE suicide attacks, 23 of which were conducted by women, 
and many of the latter targeting political and military leaders.[3] 
Most analysts agree that Tamil suicide attacks were used primarily as special weapons to 
infiltrate tightly controlled military targets.[4] The utility of this tactic is not unique to the Tamil 
movement and has been utilized as a prime motive by nearly every organization choosing to 
implement women as suicide bombers. However, behind every tactic are larger social demands 
striving for recognition. These social movements are driven by norms, identity, and social 
structures that define sub-state actors in turmoil. This study of female suicide bombers will seek 
to address how agency and structure of Tamil society were systemic factors driving the 
organizational imperatives of the LTTE.[5] 
In the case of Sri Lanka, I argue three primary factors suggest a constructivist interpretation 
provides a more sufficient tool for understanding the use of female suicide bombers. First, a 
number of institutional programs promoted discrimination, suppression and violence against 
Tamil society; second the LTTE organization was able to harness discontent and mobilize 
women as protectors of the Tamil nation; and third, the above two factors were skillfully 
wrapped in a narrative of cultural liberation that outlined the necessity of female martyrdom. 
While realist notions of the utility of female suicide bombers as a military tactic provide a 
valuable explanation, the tactic’s emergence is better explained by understanding a broader 
spectrum of components developed in this article. 
The relationship between the individual and the social structure is viewed differently between 
rationalists and constructivists.[6] Rationalists view structure as a “function of competition and 
the distribution of material capabilities” and view rational acts as cost-benefit calculations 
producing outcomes that maximize the interests of the state.[7] Constructivists recognize the 




understandings of legitimate behavior.” Rather than being driven purely by self-interest, actors 
make choices based on what is considered legitimate within the structure of society’s values, 
norms, and other institutions. Structures restrict and also compose the identity of individuals, 
organizations and states. Relationships and norms form around political, social, and cultural 
factors thus developing an evolving structure, one that creates space for agency, or the ability of 
individuals to influence the environment they live in.[8] In this case, how structure influenced 
Tamil society to accept female suicide bombers as a viable military strategy will be examined. 
This article does not seek to discount realist objectives behind organizations implementing 
suicide attacks; these are certainly prevalent and part of the overall military strategy. Many 
explanations of female suicide bombings involve explicit materialist calculations. Understanding 
there were tactical benefits behind these attacks, this article seeks to understand the less obvious 
social and ideational determinants of female suicide bombers. Is female suicide bombing simply 
a tactic adopted in response to material incentives, or can it be better understood as an expression 
of societal decline driven by ideational variables? If particular structural and cultural stimulants 
existed in the Tamil independence movement, individuals and organizations within the Tamil 
body politic may have been more prone to endorse female suicide bombers than for tactical 
reasons alone.  
It is the primary argument of this article that a constructivist approach provides a more 
comprehensive explanation behind the emergence of female suicide terrorism in Sri Lanka and 
ultimately how sub-state organizations choose military strategies. This article does not see 
structural conditions as necessary conditions, since terrorist organizations could act independent 
of any larger social movement, however the conditions are sufficient as explanatory tools. Closer 
analysis of the conflict in Sri Lanka and particularly, the LTTE organization shows that their 
approach cannot be understood purely by realist perspectives but must address social structures 
in Sri Lanka. 
This study can help analysts understand the structural characteristics that lead societies in 
conflict to evolve towards accepting the use of female suicide bombers. Ultimately, this study 
helps us understand the conflict in Sri Lanka. It enables us better to understand the causes of a 
dangerous terrorist phenomenon and how to effectively combat it. It can also shed light on the 
debate between materialist and constructivist approaches in international relations theory, 
particularly as they apply to the formulation of military doctrine.  
Review of the Literature 
The conflict in Sri Lanka, one of South Asia’s longest and deadliest since post-colonial 
independence, has recently come to a turning point, as the Sri Lanka military destroyed Tamil 
strongholds in the north and east and assassinated the legendary, cult-like leader of the LTTE 
movement, Velupillai Prabhakaran.[9] Since 1983, over 70,000 people have been killed from the 
separatist conflict in Sri Lanka.[10] Since the end of the civil war, about 250,000 Tamils have 




quarter-century struggle for Tamil independence now rests on the shoulders of a broken LTTE 
organization operating outside the island country. The Sinhalese community forms the majority 
of the 20 million population in Sri Lanka at 82 percent. Tamils, concentrated in the north and 
east of the island, form the largest ethnic minority in Sri Lanka at 9 percent.[12] Whereas the 
rebel force once held a de facto state (including a justice, administrative and full-scale military 
departments) in the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, today authority over the 
minority Tamil population has been defused back to the ethnic majority Sinhalese.  
While many theories have evolved to explain the rise of suicide operations, most tend to focus on 
a single level of analysis. Many authors agree suicide attacks occur for materialist reasons—
fulfilling short or long-term tactical objectives[13] or carrying out a “strategic logic.”[14] 
Mohammed Hafez and Assaf Moghadam, influenced by Martha Crenshaw’s or Gordon 
McCormick’s studies of terrorism at multiple levels of analysis, have developed a similar 
framework for understanding suicide operations.[15] In attempting to deconstruct the Palestinian 
suicide phenomenon, Hafez developed a theoretical framework that analyzed the role of suicide 
attacks from multiple, interdependent levels of analyses. Operating dependent of each other, he 
dissected suicide operations onto individual, societal and organizational levels of analysis.[16] 
Moghadam furthered this contribution by applying multiple levels of analysis to the global rise 
of suicide terrorism.[17] These authors recognized that individuals and organizations 
coordinating and conducting suicide operations do not operate independent of each other, but 
require involvement on both levels. Furthermore, agents must be understood within the context 
of the variety of structural and cultural surroundings they reside in.  
Within these levels of analysis there are a variety of models one can apply when looking at 
suicide bombing. There are strategic models that focus on: a group’s desire to signal to its 
adversary;[18] a group’s aim to outbid others and garner public support;[19] play a spoiler role 
in negotiations;[20] impress foreign audiences and boost recruits.[21] Other models include 
tactical considerations, structural issues[22] and the psychological[23] impact of conflict and its 
effects on individual and group motivations. Although these models all provide useful 
explanations, this article will develop the idea that the LTTE’s use of female suicide bombers has 
been influenced less by materialist issues and more by normative and ideational factors 
emanating from structural issues. Individual acts of female suicide terrorism may at times be 
better explained with rational strategies, particularly instances that include targeted 
assassinations of political figures, however the overall use of female suicide terrorism in a 
conflict is better explained via structural considerations the society experiences. By eliminating 
one or more of the structural variables, the propensity of female suicide terrorism may be 
lessened. 
The LTTE have conducted a number of suicide missions against military, government and 
civilian targets in Colombo: the World Trade Center, the Temple of the Tooth and the 
international airport. One-quarter of their attacks, many involving women, have been aimed at 
assassinating political officials.[24] The Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by 




when one female bomber attempted to kill her on December 18, 1999. LTTE suicide attacks 
have tended to surge during times when a military victory was important to reach a “balance of 
deterrence.”[25] 
It is unlikely the Tamil Tigers have recruited from outside Sri Lanka for suicide bombers.[26] 
Their targets remain within the island nation, except for the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 
India. The trends show that a majority of attacks have occurred in the north and east of the 
country and the capital city of Colombo. 
 
 
Figure 1: Suicide Attacks in Sri Lanka[27] 
There are significant tactical reasons to use female suicide bombers over other tactics. Security 
forces tend to have more difficulty discerning female bombers from males due to traditional 
dress (a long shalwar kameez is often worn by Tamil women in Sri Lanka), conservative values 
that prevent men from touching / looking at women, and the LTTE’s ability to create 
sophisticated bombs hidden in belts, brassiers or a feigned pregnancy. Women are also able to 
penetrate hardened structures easier than men by using the above techniques. Using women also 
provides psychological impact to LTTE military strategies via the extraordinary media attention 
female bombers bring.  
They are also fairly efficient for they only require the death of one combatant, whereas direct 
assaults risk numerous lives. Thus, female suicide bombers bring substantial value to the 
asymmetric toolkit. However, tactics were only a temporary measure of a much larger internal 
struggle that occurred in Sri Lanka. The following historical outline provides context for 






Insurgent and terrorist organizations are essentially political institutions, representing a pe
disenfranchised group that act out and enforce their political views through violence. Through a 
“collective rationality” they seek to enact a “radical change in the status quo” by forcing 
amendments in the government structure or deposing leaders from their positions.[28] In m
ways, the LTTE organization represented this kind of collective body that experienced and 
reacted to systemic and institutionalized discrimination from the Sri Lankan government. 
Claudia Brunner writes: “Political violence, terrorism, and resistance that take the form of 
suicide attacks occur in very specific contexts of asymmetric power relations.”[
any 
29]  In Sri La
these occurred under a highly organized militant organization that came as a result of limited 
protection provided to Tamils from the state. Western history will remember the LTTE as a 
terrorist organization, but Tamils will always consider them a national liberation movement.[
nka, 
30] 
Western scholars should keep Brunner’s insight in mind: that occidentalist representations by 
western analysts tend to “mask colonial and postcolonial power relations and structural violence 
in its multiple dimensions.”[31] In other words, the West can often misinterpret relationships and 
 
ze 
perceptions other societies have with western established institutions.  
Some of the structural discrimination was a result of the colonial and hegemonic institutions 
established by the British prior to independence and were subsequently carried over by the new,
local elites. Colonialism was a reflexive pattern from the British to Sinhalese—to maximi
power and control over the minority ethnic group.[32] In practice and ideology, the Sri Lankan 
state produced and perpetuated a level of colonial domination over the Tamil nation that 
strengthened and developed Tamil collective identity, particularly among women.[33] 
SJ Tambiah argues that Tamil - Sinhalese identities are constructions that did not necessari
match reality on the ground. For example, the two communities frequently inter-married, spoke 
both languages and often converted to Buddhism or Hindu. Tambiah calls recent conflicts 
“manufactured—a truly twentieth century phenomenon.”[
ly 
34] This phenomenon was an inherited 
aspect of Portuguese, Dutch and British occupations. The first two colonizers pushed religious 
intolerance by favoring certain groups over others.[35] A Sinhalese community developed in the 
north and southwestern parts of Sri Lanka while a Tamil community consolidated in the north 
and east. Under British colonial rule, the minority Tamils were given a disproportionate share o
authority. The limited agricultural yield in the Tamil territory forced Tamils to take part in civil 
service and administrative jobs, while the Sinhalese were employed in low-paying agricultu
work. In general, Tamils flooded the upper and middle classes while Sinhalese made up most o
the lower class. Structural barriers were established by British and Tamil administrators to 





government dominated by Sinhalese nationalists sought to restructure the colonial imbalance and 







s their identity while promoting 
Sinhalese. These factors contributed to the development of a radicalized generation of youth 
3 
n, and Muslims number about 7 percent.[36
Structural Obstacles in Sri Lanka 
This section will look at a number of structural factors within the Sri Lanka state that sup
Tamil identity and facilitated ethnic violence. It will look at political and constitutional polici
that discriminated against Tamils in an effort to suppres
willing to use terrorism to uphold their ethnic identity. 
The traditional homelands of Tamils are in Jaffna, Vavuniya, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee. 
Tamils also reside in other areas of Sri Lanka, namely the capital Colombo. They comprise 1
percent of the island’s 18 million inhabitants, while Sinhalese Buddhists make up about 75 
percent of the populatio ] While most Tamils are 
Hindu, there are significant Christian Tamils and Muslims that speak Tamil but do not consider 
themselves Tamil.[37] 
A major structural factor in Sri Lanka was the encouragement of ethnic outbidding instituted
Sinhalese and Buddhist elites eager to recreate a Sinhalese-only state. In 1956, the Official 
Language Act (“Sinhalese Only Act”) was established that made Sinhalese the only official 
language in Sri Lanka. It was instituted with strong lobbying by pro-Sinhalese and pro-Buddhist 
institutions seeking to reconstitute the country by ethnic lines, calling for a “Sri Lanka for the 
Sinhalese.”[
 by 
38] Despite, significant rioting by Tamils in the north, the policy was enshrined and 
became a mechanism for alienating Tamils from civil service jobs and the government. Wit
twenty years, the government developed an “institutional culture negating minority rights.”[
hin 
93 ] 
State jobs employing Tamil speakers declined from 30 percent to 5.9 percent by 1990.[40] 
Tamils in science-based education curriculums fell from 35 percent in 1970 to 19 percent in 
1975.[41] Most significant, was the drop in Tamil armed forces rolls—from 1956 to 1970 it 




skills back to Tamil militant organizations and eventually the LTTE. 
Ethnic domination was furthered by the May 1972 constitution changing Ceylon into Democra
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. The 1956 language policy was enshrined in the 1972 
constitution, making it inviolable. Minority protections previously put in place by the B
were eliminated. The legislature was given power over the judiciary in order to depose justices 
that did not support the government. In 1976, the Sixth Amendment to the constitution 
“prohibited political parties and individuals from demanding or advocating a separate state for
the Tami-speaking people as a solution to the intractable ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.”[43] This 
effectively marginalized Tamil political groups and forced them to begin working outside the 
democratic system as no Tamil political representative could openly espouse separatism and hold 
ct 
d 
a seat in parliament. 
Tamil reprisals were met with further crackdowns including The Prevention of Terrorism A
(PTA) in 1979, which was a hallmark effort by Sri Lanka to use brutal tactics such as torture an




on by security forces. The inability for 
Tamil political parties, namely the popular Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) to counter the 
oint that engulfed the nation in all-out ethnic 
warfare. President Jayewardene in response to the anti-Tamil violence of 1983 blamed Tamils 
for th
inion … the more you put pressure in the north, 
the happier the Sinhalese people will be here … Really if I starve the Tamils out, the 
anyone, including innocent Tamil civilians and imprison them without trial. The effect was an 
escalation of violence in the 1980s and further oppressi
violence led to a new radicalized generation of youth.  
The 1983 riots against Tamils was the breaking p
e violence brought on them by Sinhalese.  
I am not worried about the opinion of the Tamil people … now we cannot think of 
them, not about their lives or their op
Sinhalese people will be happy.[44] 
Tamil nationalist fervor has grown at every attempt the Sri Lanka government made to 
undermine national determination. A combination of failures to bridge differences between 
groups through a constitutional process, poor political leadership that used Sinhalese nation
for its own advantages, and a systematic process to undermine cultural identity among Tamils
were significant structural elements that led to Tamil disenfranchisement. Assistance from 
foreign powers and a strong organizational culture brought the LTTE to the foray as the only 




he Tamil population unsecured from state oppression. Tamils were forced to develop 
their own security mechanisms, of which the LTTE quickly became the organization that would 
n 1991 
 number of battles: Pooneryn, Mullaitivu, Puliyankulam, 
Kanakarayankulam, and Elephant Pass. In 2003, the LTTE said that armed struggle for 
indep
er more than four decades of nonviolent and 
peaceful constitutional struggle proved to be futile and due to the absence of a means 
lead them.  
By mid 1989, LTTE were able to fend off security forces and essentially protect the Tamil 
population against their incursions. By mid 1990, they had established a de facto state in the 
north and eastern portions of Sri Lanka, especially outside the main urban areas. Betwee
and 2000, the LTTE were victorious in a
endence (Eelam) was considered:  
a measure of self-defense and as a means for the realization of the Tamil right to 
self-determination [that] arose only aft
to resolve the conflict peacefully.[45] 
Political and constitutional structures in Sri Lanka flamed ethnic outbidding and blocked the 
minority Tamil population a respectable place in the democratic process. The failure of politica
elites to build a balanced approach towards ethnic representation compelled groups such as the
LTTE to follow a separatist pat
l 
 
h. It also forced Tamils to look towards the LTTE as their only 
real political voice in the process. LTTE would take this one step further by using violence to 





s. LTTE was 
also an institution that carried the norms and values of the Tamil populace. When they could not 
f 
Organizing a response via The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam  
This section looks at the structured organization that developed in response to ethnic suppressio
and how it was able to harmonize public rage with the radical LTTE political vision. LTTE 
harnessed existing Tamil militarism to achieve political, strategic and tactical aim
be met via the democratic process, the LTTE answered with violence. 
LTTE was a centralized organization with a top-down command structure. The LTTE had all o
the necessary institutions to run a de-facto state within a state.[46] It had a charismatic politica
leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran that ran a highly centralized system of governance outside the 
urban areas of north and east Sri Lanka with associated cabinet and administrative offices. In 
areas it controlled, the LTTE collected taxes, administered justice, provided social services and 
had a significant military presence to include an air force, amphibious group, airborne group, 
intelligence group and a suicide commando cell. The influence of the LTTE and particularly its
leader was clear in the cult-like reverence followers had for the leader and organization. Senior




47] others refer t
him as the “sun god.” Subscribing to the LTTE was not necessarily forced upon Tamils, more 
often they were supported due to their strong leadership and ability to unite Tamils and the 
variety of Tamil political p
o 
arties that emerged. Few Tamils opposed the LTTE, however, some 
have suggested this is a result of LTTE retribution tactics for those that left or did not subscribe 
to their organization.[48] 
Another structural factor that empowered the LTTE was foreign influence. The LTTE had 
obtained illegal weapons through a variety of arms markets in Burma and Singapore where larg
Tamil communities live.[
e 
49] They also received up to $300 million per year from an establi
diaspora around the world and licit and illicit businesses.[
shed 
50] Prior to these transactions, India
provided sanctuary, arms and training for Tamil guerillas early in the civil war as a way to 
prevent Sri Lanka from establishing relationships with other countries such as Israel and the 
United States. India also had a significant Tamil population in southern India’s Tamil Nadu 
region, which lobbied New Delhi to support the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Backed by foreign support,
namely training and material aid via the India Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), LTTE was 
able to become a formidable force.[
 
 
51] Not only was India involved with material transfers, bu
it was a political mediator with the Sri Lankan government in an effort to win greater aut
for Tamils. This changed when in 1987 LTTE, fearing India support to a rival Tamil political 
party would weaken their movement, refused to participate in a peace accord to disarm. 
According to the dictates of the accord, Indian peacekeeping forces (IPKF) were deployed to the





52] While India’s involvement initially empowered the LTTE over other organizations, 
its human rights abuses also rallied Tamil passions towards supporting LTTE violence and 
terrorism. Furthermore, the presence of foreign troops justified arguments that the Tamil nation 
was being threatened. This perception, coupled with the personal experience of persecution and 




Initially, women were involved with information operations (including propaganda 
dissemination and intelligence collection), fundraising, logistics, medical care and recruitment. 
In 1983, as a response to growing pressure, the LTTE created a wing for women called the 
Women’s Front of the Liberation Tigers. The first cadre of fighters were trained in 1985 in Tamil 
Nadu, India and by July 1986, the first group saw combat against the Sri Lankan military.[53] 
More women were recruited into the LTTE as a result of Tamil village massacres in the early 
1990s. Representation of Tamil women in military, administrative and logistics positions at one 
time constituted approximately 35 percent of all LTTE fighters.[54] According to one researcher 
that spent time with LTTE women: “(…) many of the women joining the LTTE feel autonomous 
and able to decide about their destiny for themselves for the first time in their lives. They retain 
this feeling and this attitude on their return to civil life.”[55] Whether most women felt a sense of 
liberation as cadres in the LTTE is unknown, but this seems to be a general feeling among many 
who have been interviewed. Many women that joined in the mid-1980s were victims of rape by 
Sinhalese or IPKF troops. According to the Hindu faith, of which many Tamils subscribe to, 
when a woman is raped she cannot be married or have children.[56] For many Tamil women, 
redemption of the self and nation was gained through violence. As one author writes:  
Violence justified ideologically in the name of politics structures social relations and 
colonizes social space, enabling conditions of possibility/impossibility. (…) Violent 
practice produces oppositional and binary bodies, heroic and aggressive, criminal 
and communal, which are hierarchized and celebrated, minoritized and 
humiliated.[57] 
In other words, violence on one end produces a reaction of violence on the other end. While 
realists would argue female suicide bombers are products of an organization’s material needs, 
constructivists would suggest the ideational values experienced from violence promote the 
perpetuation of further violence and bring the potential female bomber to the point where 
organizations can realize her utility in their materialist objective. As Nira Wickramasinghe 
writes: “In situations of violence, therefore, security is not only contextual and malleable, it is 
also fundamentally reactive.”[58] The lack of a secure environment compelled women to enter a 
self-help process.  
Massacres in the 1990s in eastern Tamil villages brought even more into the LTTE ranks. While 
the LTTE demanded each family give one child to the organization, women and many children 
voluntarily enlisted as soldiers. This increased the level of female participation in the 
organization and compelled LTTE leadership to relax traditional concepts of womanhood, as 
Patricia Lawrence writes: “…most women can easily recite the ‘Four Virtues’ of Tamil women: 
modesty, charm, coyness, and fear—now replaced by the new notions of courage, confidence, 
and thirst for liberation.”[59] 
Another structural factor that influenced the situation was the failure of counterinsurgency forces 
to effectively safeguard Tamil citizens. In most cases, the security forces were the victimizers 




insecurity in Tamil society. One Tamil woman expressed this fear as such: “As a Tamil in the 
present day, the biggest threat is the security forces—having to produce identification.”[60] 
Many were detained, indiscriminately searched, sexually harassed and even tortured by state 
security forces or IPKF troops. This caused Tamils to seek other mechanisms and organizations 
to defend themselves. As Nira Wickramasinghe writes: “Thus when the state breaks its contract 
to protect all its citizens, people are left to create their own security.”[61] The failure of the state 
to provide security for its people empowered the LTTE as most Tamils sought their assistance.  
A study on the intersection between evolutionary theory and political violence finds women may 
be more prone to violence when their reproductive opportunities are threatened.[62] Fighting 
involving women in a group setting in the protection of the group, such as a tribe against another 
tribe may make sense as one is protecting the survival of the family—however, in general, 
individual female violence against another tribe may not occur without these preconditions.[63] 
Thus, individual female decisions are highly influenced by societal / group forces. Whereas the 
state acts to preserve the interests and the survival of its people, sub-state groups act in the same 
manner, be it on a lower level. In the case of the Tamil people, where the state failed to protect 
Tamil interests and actively impinged upon them, Tamil identity and survival was threatened and 
the process of self-help ensued. Tamils were forced to protect their own interests against an 
aggressive Sinhalese-only system. Female participation in this struggle became a societal 
obligation. In an evolutionary sense, it became the fitness of women to protect the Tamil 
“family” through self-sacrifice.  
The LTTE was efficient in harnessing the norms and values that embodied a national myth of 
Tamil nationhood. The threat on the livelihood of the Tamil nation was a real fear for Tamils 
experiencing suppression and violence from Sinhalese and IPKF security forces. The LTTE 
harnessed these existing fears and rallied women to protect the next generation. To do so, LTTE 
exploited shared beliefs and narratives that could justify and mobilize a culture of martyrdom. 
Sub-culture of Martyrdom 
This section looks at the culture of martyrdom in Tamil society, a structural characteristic that 
LTTE harnessed and channeled towards fulfilling its strategic objectives. While realists would 
argue that female suicide violence is a temporary adjustment to achieve strategic or tactical 
objectives, constructivists would add this military strategy must be “made consistent with social 
norms of female behavior”[64] before it can be implemented, and precedes the discussion of 
acceptable tactics. Sub-state movements like the LTTE used intellectual leaders, cultural themes 
and historical narratives to mobilize an already frustrated population to support the insurgency, 
and moreover, protect the existence of the nation. This is exemplified in the pervasive culture of 
martyrdom in Sri Lanka that embraced male and female heroes. While LTTE may have been 
instrumental in organizing the culture of martyrdom, it was an existing value that was wholly 




Aggressive self identity for Tamil women has generally been restricted by structures based on 
tradition and conservatism. While some examples of female warriors exist in historical memory, 
frontline combat is not given traditional approval. It’s generally considered a new phenomenon 
that was copied off of the struggles led by Gandhi and the Indian National Congress as well as 
the movement led by Suhas Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army.[65] The LTTE has 
modeled its organizational structure off of the INA and has treated its women according to the 
INA example. The Rani of Jhansi regiment of the INA was led by Lakshmi Sahgal nee 
Swaminathan, a Tamil who brought considerable pride to the LTTE, inspired many Tamil 
women joined the INA cause. At first, the LTTE was slow to integrate women into the 
organization, so as not to offend the conservative Tamil culture. Women were initially given 
supportive roles in the organization as nurses, administrators and caretakers. Over time, 
restrictions were loosened as the organization needed more recruits and society experienced 
greater oppression from state security forces. 
As the materialist value of female suicide violence was realized, institutions were established to 
ensure it would be legitimized and maintained. The commitment to martyrdom was a unique 
LTTE trait not readily seen among other insurgent groups in Sri Lanka, such as the Janata 
Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) group waging an insurgent movement in the south. LTTE created a 
special battalion for their future martyrs known as the Black Tigers. Their first attack was on 
July 5, 1987 when a bomber drove a truck of explosives into an army camp at Nelliyady. This 
day was given a sacred marking as an official Tamil holiday, called Black Tigers Day. Holidays 
have been an essential symbol for venerating heroes of the Tamil nation. On 19 April and 26 
September, honor is given to Annai Pupati (a mother of 10 children) and Tiyaki Tilipan 
respectively for fasting to death in protest against the Indian Peace-Keeping Force’s occupation 
of Tamil territory in Northern Sri Lanka. In a sense, these women have come to embody the 
Tamil-mother image in a similar way that “Lady Liberty” represents life and liberty in the 
western world.[66] Annai Pupati is represented on billboards throughout Tamil territories—
adorned in bright red and gold colors, giving a “religious aura to her action and her 
commemoration.”[67] She is often likened to the fierce goddess Durga—a warrior archetype of 
the divine mother. Symbols and their relation to myth are an essential component of martyrdom 
that builds a link to the past. 
While Mia Bloom argues that the LTTE “has never made the conflict about religion,” others, like 
Michael Roberts contend that religion had a significant role in LTTE narrative selection.[68] The 
selection of symbols is very important. Michael Roberts argues that LTTE strategically used 
symbols and ritual to “mobilize supporters and legitimize their cause among Tamil speakers, 
while also cementing the loyalty of their personnel.”[69] One powerful symbol adopted by LTTE 
fighters was the adornment of a cyanide capsule around the neck. The vial itself was to be used 
in case the female fighter was captured. Songs, poems and martyrologies were chanted 
celebrating the virtue of the slow death cyanide brought.[70] One became a “walking witness” 
by wearing the vial proving commitment to the organization, Tamil self-determination and the 




Underlying every suicide attack are potent religious symbols depicting sacrifice, death and 
resurrection through martyrdom. Many argue that the LTTE are a secular nationalist 
organization.[72] This may be misleading since the organization actually venerates, upholds and 
exploits existing institutions, such as the Hindu faith. While the organization has secular minded 
goals, its associates have a variety of religious and secular motivations. By merging the sacred 
with the secular, the organization is able to harness societal narratives that venerate the concept 
of martyrdom. Religious ideology helps society embrace the totality of struggle, as if it is a 
cosmic undertaking that requires any means necessary.[73] Social movements can easily become 
totalitarian when language and actions commit to using extreme violence to eliminate the 
opposition. Organizations seek to exploit the role of religious symbolism and terminology in the 
context of women’s virtue.[74] By introducing a narrative of “the sacred” they redefine the roles 
of women in society from innocent and protected to courageous and protectors.[75] These 
narratives become structures in which women’s roles are partially defined thus allowing for the 
realization of martyrdom as an acceptable practice within society. 
The historical narrative embraced by Tamils was an invented one that utilized prevailing norms 
and ideational features of Tamil identity. As Ness points out, the logic of female suicide 
bombing in Tamil culture was created around a “trans-historical structure” embedded within 
perceived historical myths, “imagined and embraced communally” and able to create 
“participation structures” that prompted further suicidal violence.[76] This narrative and 
performance based ritual which female martyrdom embodied, was able to unite disenfranchised 
women against a common enemy they saw as the state. While not all would become martyrs, 
female Tigers entered into a sacred tradition by becoming soldiers and defending their nation. 
They saw themselves as a continuation of the past, and the latest example of those proclaimed by 
LTTE propaganda, such as Sathyabama, wife of Krishna.[77] Giving one’s life for the cause, be 
it in terms of service to Prabhakaran or fulfilling an LTTE mission, all were considered an honor. 
Roberts mentions a goddess, Kannaki that has been incorporated into LTTE literature. Her 
representation marks Hindu temples in Sri Lanka and she is well known among Tamils. She has 
“both a chaste dimension as well as the character of an avenging goddess.”[78] It is little surprise 
that Kannaki would provide a provocative image worthy of emulation. Adele Balasinghma, a 
sociologist close to Prabhakaron writes “behind the appearance of every uniformed female 
fighter, is a tender, gentle and passionate young women with all the qualities attributed to 
femininity.”[79] The LTTE women hold the qualities of the Goddess Kannaki as a model in their 
aspiration to be accepted as women and revered as heroes. 
Much like Palestinian political organizations, the LTTE have harnessed a cult-like atmosphere 
behind suicide operations, but they have also established highly professional institutions to 
ensure the reverence of martyrdom is maintained, such as the Office of Great Heroes. Tamils 
have established immaculate gravestones and cemeteries throughout Tamil territory allowing 
society to pay respect to the fallen. They have also built specific “hero stones” that are devised to 





Similar to Hezbollah, Chechen nationalists, and Palestinian organizations, LTTE has created 
“rhetorical strategies” to legitimize and institutionalize martyrdom.[81] These are ways of 
reframing the context of suicidal violence to be made acceptable to society. A Tamil Catholic 
priest described the elaborate techniques as follows: 
Heroic death founded within the fire of Tamil nationalism has given birth to a new 
set of terms, almost all derived from the ancient Tamil religion of Saivism; indeed, 
within the North and East Tamil nationalism has the appeal of a new religious 
movement. Prabhakaran…requests the people to venerate those who died in the 
battle for Eelam as sannyasis (ascetics) who renounced their personal desires and 
transcended egoistic existence for a common cause of higher virtue. I have seen 
hundreds of shrines erected in Jaffna by the friends and relatives of those LTTE 
cadres who have died in various actions; and the rituals performed with offering of 
flowers and lighting of oil lamps are those normally reserved to Saivite deities and 
saints.[82] 
The use of rhetoric is important since it creates rules and legitimacy for martyrdom, and thus a 
structure in which women can interpret as justification for an otherwise heinous act. Transposing 
religious rationale behind secular goals, LTTE has effectively channeled popular perceptions, 
narratives and myths to legitimize martyrdom in the name of Tamil nationalism. In this sense, 
LTTE women may embrace martyrdom as a purely political act as opposed to psychological, 
religious or revenge type motivations that are often seen in other examples of female suicide 
missions such as Chechnya, Palestine or Iraq.  
Conclusion 
This study is particularly important due to its current relevance. The Sri Lankan government 
continues to undermine any opportunity for Tamil self-governance, let alone provide significant 
structural openings in the political, economic, and state systems for Tamil livelihood.[83] Failure 
to negotiate opportunities for Tamils in the current Sri Lanka state could manifest the same 
structural conditions that led to Tamil separatism, conflict, and endorsement of suicide terrorism. 
How the Sri Lanka government deals with the post-conflict period will determine whether 
reconciliation or violence emerges. 
The Sri Lanka government should understand that these sufficient conditions exist in Tamil 
society and a charismatic leader could harness, re-formulate, and operationalize them toward 
achieving political objectives. One area this article only briefly touched upon was the charisma 
of Prabhakaran and how this mobilized Tamil people. Assessing the LTTE movement post-
Prabhakaran could show that the conditions he helped hold together for female martyrdom may 
be too weak to bring back. There is an intersection between what is tactically useful and what is 
socially appropriate at any particular time and charismatic leaders often act as the lynchpin for 
that relationship. This article agrees there are realist factors that drove LTTE to use female 




structural barriers put in place by Sinhalese politicians, the snow-balling effect these structures 
had on creating ethnic separatism and the deep scars this left in Tamil society which made 
suicidal violence an act to be revered.  
Realist theory is an important measure for understanding the tactical and strategic motives 
behind female suicide bombers, but it does not provide a full spectrum of their use; how they 
emerge; and why individuals, organizations, and societies embrace them as a military strategy. 
Constructivism provides a better analysis by looking at the structural elements sub-state 
organizations live in and how they develop their normative and ideational values that bring 
female suicide bombers to fruition. If certain structural factors are eliminated, the propensity of 
female suicide bombers may be lessened. This can be evidenced by the absence of female suicide 
bombers in at least one insurgency, Afghanistan. The same tactical and strategic values apply to 
suicide bombers in this conflict, yet women have been completely absent as insurgents or suicide 
bombers. The realist argument would suggest female suicide bombers should be used in order to 
penetrate secure environments that men cannot. But in fact, men have attempted to use the 
female disguise, wearing the traditional burkha to evade detection or police searches. A 
constructivist argument would suggest that women have not been given participatory space in the 
insurgency due to the hardened cultural structures within a highly conservative Pashtun society 
that prevent their inclusion in any activity outside the home, let alone the Taliban organization.  
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